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Over the past 20 years Congress has encour-
aged the U.S. military to supply intelligence,
equipment, and training to civilian police. That
encouragement has spawned a culture of para-
militarism in American law enforcement.
The 1980s and 1990s have seen marked
changes in the number of state and local para-
military units, in their mission and deploy-
ment, and in their tactical armament.
According to a recent academic survey, nearly
90 percent of the police departments surveyed
in cities with populations over 50,000 had para-
military units, as did 70 percent of the depart-
ments surveyed in communities with popula-
tions under 50,000. The Pentagon has been
equipping those units with M-16s, armored
personnel carriers, and grenade launchers. The
police paramilitary units also conduct training
exercises with active duty Army Rangers and
Navy SEALs.
State and local police departments are
increasingly accepting the military as a model
for their behavior and outlook. The sharing of
training and technology is producing a shared
mindset. The problem is that the mindset of the
soldier is simply not appropriate for the civilian
police officer. Police officers confront not an
“enemy” but individuals who are protected by
the Bill of Rights. Confusing the police func-
tion with the military function can lead to dan-
gerous and unintended consequences—such as
unnecessary shootings and killings.
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Introduction 
One of the most alarming side effects of
the federal government’s war on drugs is
the militarization of law enforcement in
America. There are two aspects to the mili-
tarization phenomenon. First, the Ameri-
can tradition of civil-military separation is
breaking down as Congress assigns more
and more law enforcement responsibilities
to the armed forces. Second, state and local
police officers are increasingly emulating
the war-fighting tactics of soldiers. Most
Americans are unaware of the militariza-
tion phenomenon simply because it has
been creeping along imperceptibly for
many years. To get perspective, it will be
useful to consider some recent events: 
•The U.S. military played a role in the
Waco incident. In preparation for
their disastrous 1993 raid on the
Branch Davidian compound, federal
law enforcement agents were trained
by Army Special Forces at Fort Hood,
Texas. And Delta Force commanders
would later advise Attorney General
Janet Reno to insert gas into the com-
pound to end the 51-day siege. Waco
resulted in the largest number of civil-
ian deaths ever arising from a law
enforcement operation.1
•Between 1995 and 1997 the Department
of Defense gave police departments 1.2
million pieces of military hardware,
including 73 grenade launchers and 112
armored personnel carriers. The Los
Angeles Police Department has acquired
600 Army surplus M-16s. Even small-
town police departments are getting into
the act. The seven-officer department in
Jasper, Florida, is now equipped with
fully automatic M-16s.2
•In 1996 President Bill Clinton appointed
a military commander, Gen. Barry R.
McCaffrey, to oversee enforcement of the
federal drug laws as the director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy.3
•Since the mid-1990s U.S. Special Forces
have been going after drug dealers in
foreign countries. According to the U.S.
Southern Command, American soldiers
occupy three radar sites in Colombia to
help monitor drug flights. And Navy
SEALs have assisted in drug interdic-
tion in the port city of Cap-Haitien,
Haiti.4
•The U.S. Marine Corps is now patrolling
the Mexican border to keep drugs and
illegal immigrants out of this country. In
1997 a Marine anti-drug patrol shot and
killed 18-year-old Esequiel Hernandez as
he was tending his family’s herd of goats
on private property. The Justice
Department settled a wrongful death
lawsuit with the Hernandez family for
$1.9 million.5
•In 1998 Indiana National Guard Engin-
eering Units razed 42 crack houses in
and around the city of Gary. The
National Guard has also been deployed
in Washington, D.C., to drive drug deal-
ers out of certain locations.6
•In 1999 the Pentagon asked President
Clinton to appoint a “military leader”
for the continental United States in
the event of a terrorist attack on
American soil. The powers that would
be wielded by such a military com-
mander were not made clear.7
What is clear—and disquieting—is that
the lines that have traditionally separated
the military mission from the police mis-
sion are getting badly blurred.
Over the last 20 years Congress has
encouraged the U.S. military to supply
intelligence, equipment, and training to
civilian police. That encouragement has
spawned a culture of paramilitarism in
American police departments. By virtue of
their training and specialized armament,
state and local police officers are adopting
the tactics and mindset of their military
mentors. The problem is that the actions
and values of the police officer are distinct-
ly different from those of the warrior. The
job of a police officer is to keep the peace,
but not by just any means. Police officers
are expected to apprehend suspected law-
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breakers while adhering to constitutional
procedures. They are expected to use mini-
mum force and to deliver suspects to a court
of law. The soldier, on the other hand, is an
instrument of war. In boot camp, recruits
are trained to inflict maximum damage on
enemy personnel. Confusing the police
function with the military function can
have dangerous consequences. As
Albuquerque police chief Jerry Glavin has
noted, “If [cops] have a mind-set that the
goal is to take out a citizen, it will happen.”8
Paramilitarism threatens civil liberties, con-
stitutional norms, and the well-being of all
citizens. Thus, the use of paramilitary tac-
tics in everyday police work should alarm
people of goodwill from across the political
spectrum.  
This paper will examine the militariza-
tion of law enforcement at the local level,
with particular emphasis on SWAT (Special
Weapons and Tactics) units. The paper will
conclude that the special skills of SWAT
personnel and their military armaments are
necessary only in extraordinary circum-
stances. The deployment of such units
should therefore be infrequent. More gener-
ally, Congress should recognize that sol-
diers and police officers perform different
functions. Federal lawmakers should dis-
courage the culture of paramilitarism in
police departments by keeping the military
out of civilian law enforcement.
A Brief History of the
Relationship between the
Military and Civilian Law
Enforcement
The use of British troops to enforce
unpopular laws in the American colonies
helped to convince the colonists that King
George III and Parliament were intent on
establishing tyranny.9 The Declaration of
Independence specifically refers to those
practices, castigating King George for “quar-
tering large Bodies of Armed Troops among
us” and for “protecting [soldiers], by mock
Trial, from Punishment, for any Murders
which they should commit on the Inhabit-
ants of these States.” The colonists com-
plained that the king “has kept among us, in
Times of peace, Standing Armies, without
the consent of our Legislatures. He has affect-
ed to render the Military independent of, and
superior to, the Civil Power.”
After the Revolutionary War, Americans
were determined to protect themselves
against the threat of an overbearing mili-
tary. The Founders inserted several safe-
guards into the Constitution to ensure that
the civilian powers of the new republic
would remain distinct from, and superior
to, the military: 
The Congress shall have Power . . .
To declare War . . . To raise and sup-
port Armies . . . To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the
land and Naval Forces . . . To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing, the Militia.10
No State shall, without the con-
sent of Congress, . . . keep Troops, or
Ships of War in time of Peace, . . . or
engage in War, unless actually invad-
ed, or in such imminent Danger as
will not admit of delay.11
The President shall be Command-
er in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia
of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United
States.12
A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.13
No soldier shall, in time of peace
be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.14
It is important to emphasize that those
provisions were not considered controver-
sial. Indeed, the debate at the time of the
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founding did not concern the wisdom of
limiting the role of the military. The debate
was only with respect to whether those con-
stitutional safeguards would prove ade-
quate.15
During the Civil War period the principle
of civil-military separation broke down.
President Abraham Lincoln suspended the
writ of habeas corpus, and citizens were
arrested and tried before military tribunals.16
After the Civil War, Congress imposed mar-
tial law in the rebel states. And to shield the
military’s reconstruction policies from con-
stitutional challenges, Congress barred the
Supreme Court from jurisdiction over feder-
al appellate court rulings involving postwar
reconstruction controversies.17
The Army enforced an array of laws in the
South and, not surprisingly, became politi-
cally meddlesome. In several states the Army
interfered with local elections and state polit-
ical machinery. Such interference during the
presidential election of 1876 provoked a
political firestorm.18 The Democratic candi-
date, Samuel J. Tilden, won the popular vote
while the Republican candidate, Rutherford
B. Hayes, garnered more electoral votes. The
Republican victory was tainted by accusa-
tions that federal troops had stuffed the bal-
lot box in a few southern states to favor
Hayes. Negotiations between the political
parties ensued and a compromise was
reached. The Democrats agreed to concede
the election to “Rutherfraud” Hayes (as dis-
gruntled partisans nicknamed him) on the
condition that federal troops be withdrawn
from the South.19 The Republicans agreed. 
The Army’s machinations in the South also
set the stage for a landmark piece of legisla-
tion, the Posse Comitatus Act.20 The one-sen-
tence law provided, “Whoever, except in cases
and under such circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or by Act of
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute
the laws shall be fined no more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.”21 Southern Democrats proposed the
Posse Comitatus bill in an effort to get
Congress to reaffirm, by law, the principle of
civil-military separation. President Hayes
signed that bill into law in June 1878. 
Federal troops have occasionally played a
role in quelling civil disorder—without prior
congressional authorization—in spite of the
plain terms of the Posse Comitatus Act. The
U.S. Army, for example, was used to restore
order in industrial disputes in the late 19th
and early 20th century. Except for the illegal
occupation of the Coeur d’Alene mining
region in Idaho in 1899–1901, army troops
were used by presidents to accomplish specif-
ic and temporary objectives—after which they
were immediately withdrawn.22 Federal
troops and federalized National Guardsmen
were called upon to enforce the desegrega-
tion of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, in
1957; in Oxford, Mississippi, in 1962; and in
Selma, Alabama, in 1963. 
Over the past 20 years there has been a dra-
matic expansion of the role of the military in
law enforcement activity. In 1981 Congress
passed the Military Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Officials Act.23 That law amend-
ed the Posse Comitatus Act insofar as it autho-
rized the military to “assist” civilian police in
the enforcement of drug laws. The act encour-
aged the military to (a) make available equip-
ment, military bases, and research facilities to
federal, state, and local police; (b) train and
advise civilian police on the use of the equip-
ment; and (c) assist law enforcement person-
nel in keeping drugs from entering the coun-
try. The act also authorized the military to
share information acquired during military
operations with civilian law enforcement
agencies. 
As the drug war escalated throughout
the 1980s, the military was drawn further
and further into the prohibition effort by a
series of executive and congressional initia-
tives: 
•In 1986 President Ronald Reagan issued
a National Decision Security Directive
designating drugs as an official threat to
“national security,” which encouraged a
tight-knit relationship between civilian
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law enforcement and the military.24
• In 1987 Congress set up an adminis-
trative apparatus to facilitate transac-
tions between civilian law enforcement
officials and the military. For example,
a special office with an 800 number was
established to handle inquiries by
police officials regarding acquisition of
military hardware.25
•In 1988 Congress directed the National
Guard to assist law enforcement agen-
cies in counterdrug operations. Today
National Guard units in all 50 states fly
across America’s landscape in dark
green helicopters, wearing camouflage
uniforms and armed with machine
guns, in search of marijuana fields.26
•In 1989 President George Bush created
six regional joint task forces (JTFs)
within the Department of Defense.
Those task forces are charged with
coordinating the activities of the mili-
tary and police agencies in the drug
war, including joint training of military
units and civilian police. JTFs can be
called on by civilian law enforcement
agencies in counterdrug cases when
police feel the need for military rein-
forcement.27
•In 1994 the Department of Justice and
the Department of Defense signed a
memorandum of understanding,
which has enabled the military to
transfer technology to state and local
police departments. Civilian officers
now have at their disposal an array of
high-tech military items previously
reserved for use during wartime.28
All of those measures have resulted in the
militarization of a wide range of activity in
the United States that had been previously
considered the domain of civilian law
enforcement. As one reporter has observed,
“Not since federal troops were deployed to
the former Confederate states during
Reconstruction has the U.S. military been so
intimately involved in civilian law enforce-
ment.”29
The Militarization of the
Police Department
Not only is the military directly involved
in law enforcement; police departments are
increasingly emulating the tactics of the
armed forces in their everyday activities.
This aspect of the militarization phenome-
non has gone largely unnoticed.
The Early American Police Force
In one sense, the paramilitarism in
today’s police departments is a conse-
quence of the increasing professionalism of
police in the 20th century. Professionalism
essentially grants a monopoly of specialized
knowledge, training, and practice to certain
groups in exchange for a commitment to a
public service ideal. While that may sound
desirable for law enforcement officers, the
effects of professionalism have, in many
respects, been negative. Over the last centu-
ry police departments have evolved into
increasingly centralized, authoritarian,
autonomous, and militarized bureaucra-
cies, which has led to their isolation from
the citizenry.
Early police departments were anything
but professional. Officers were basically politi-
cal appointees, with ties to ward bosses.
Officers also had strong cultural roots in the
neighborhoods they patrolled. Police work
was more akin to social work, as jails provided
overnight lodging and soup kitchens for
tramps, lost children, and other destitute indi-
viduals. Discipline was practically nonexistent,
and law enforcement was characterized by an
arbitrary, informal process that is sometimes
dubbed “curbside justice.” Barely trained and
equipped, police aimed at regulating rather
than preventing crime, which, in the previous
century, meant something closer to policing
vice and cultural lifestyles. 
On the positive side, the early police
forces were well integrated into their com-
munities, often solving crimes by simply
chatting with people on the street corners.
On the negative side, the police were suspi-
cious of and often hostile to strangers and
5
Police depart-
ments have
evolved into
increasingly
centralized,
authoritarian,
autonomous,
and militarized
bureaucracies.
immigrants, and, having strong loyalties to
the local political machine, they were sus-
ceptible to bribery and political influence.
Throughout the 19th century police work
was considered casual labor, making it dif-
ficult for either municipalities or precinct
captains to impose any uniform standards
on patrolmen. Police did not consider
themselves a self-contained body of law
officers set apart from the general popu-
lace.
The initial round of professionalization
took place during the Progressive Era with the
appearance of early police literature, fraternal
organizations, and rudimentary recruitment
standards—all of which suggest the emergence
of a common occupational self-consciousness.
Internal and external pressures forced the
depoliticization and restructuring of police
departments, which gradually reformed into
centralized, depersonalized, hierarchical
bureaucracies. To gain control of the rank and
file, police chiefs assigned military ranks and
insignia to personnel, and some departments
required military drills. “Military methods
have been adopted and military discipline
enforced,” wrote Philadelphia police superin-
tendent James Robinson in his department’s
1912 annual report.30 A wave of police union-
ism from 1917 to 1920 was a strong indication
that police not only were acquiring a shared
occupational outlook but had come to regard
policing as a full-time career.
Two events, however, signaled the break-
away of police from their communities and
into their modern professional enclave. In
1905 the first truly modern state police force
was formed in Pennsylvania. Ostensibly creat-
ed to control crime in rural areas, the Pennsyl-
vania State Police was used mainly in labor dis-
putes, since the state militias and local police
(who were more likely to sympathize with
strikers) had been ineffective. That centralized
organization, under one commander appoint-
ed by the governor, recruited members from
across the state so that no more than a hand-
ful of officers had roots in any single commu-
nity. This new force was considered so mili-
taristic that the Pennsylvania Federation of
Labor referred to it as “Cossacks.” Despite the
misgivings of many people, Pennsylvania
started a trend. Other states began to emulate
Pennsylvania’s state police force.
The other significant event was J. Edgar
Hoover’s directorship of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. By raising standards of
training and recruitment, Hoover rescued
federal law enforcement from its former
state of corruption and mismanagement.
Hoover imbued his agents with a moral zeal
to fight crime, and in 1935 he opened the
National Police Academy, which has exert-
ed tremendous influence on police training
generally.31 Hoover’s FBI acquired a prestige
that made it the model police organization.  
Elite SWAT Units Created
There is agreement in police literature that
the incident that inspired the SWAT concept
occurred in 1966. In August of that year a
deranged man climbed to the top of the 32-
story clock tower at the University of Texas in
Austin. For 90 minutes he randomly shot 46
people, killing 15 of them, until two police
officers got to the top of the tower and killed
him. The Austin episode was so blatant that it
“shattered the last myth of safety Americans
enjoyed [and] was the final impetus the chiefs
of police needed”32 to form their own SWAT
teams. Shortly thereafter, the Los Angeles
Police Department formed the first SWAT
team and, it is said, originated the acronym
SWAT to describe its elite force. The Los
Angeles SWAT unit acquired national prestige
when it was used successfully against the
Black Panthers in 1969 and the Symbionese
Liberation Army in 1973.
Much like the FBI, the modern SWAT
team was born of public fear and the per-
ception by police that crime had reached
such proportions and criminals had
become so invincible that more armament
and more training were needed. SWAT
team members have come to consider
themselves members of an elite unit with
specialized skills and more of a military
ethos than the normal police structure.
Another striking similarity with the FBI is
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that SWAT units have gained their status
and legitimacy in the public eye by their
performance in a few sensational events.
The earliest SWAT teams consisted of
small units that could be called into action
to deal with difficult situations, such as
incidents involving hostages, barricaded
suspects, or hijackers. Early SWAT team
members were not unlike regular police
officers and were only slightly better
equipped. 
SWAT Teams Everywhere, Doing
Everything
The 1980s and 1990s saw marked changes
in the number of permanent SWAT teams
across the country, in their mission and
deployment, and in their tactical armament.
According to a 1997 study of SWAT teams
conducted by Peter Kraska and Victor
Kappeler of Eastern Kentucky University,
nearly 90 percent of the police departments
surveyed in cities with populations over
50,000 had paramilitary units, as did 70 per-
cent of the departments surveyed in commu-
nities with populations under 50,000.33
Although the proliferation of those special
units was slow in the late 1960s and early
1970s, their numbers took a leap in the mid-
1970s, and growth has remained high since
the 1980s. In fact, most SWAT teams have
been created in the 1980s and 1990s. Towns
like Jasper, Lakeland, and Palm Beach,
Florida; Lakewood, New Jersey; Chapel Hill,
North Carolina; Charlottesville, Virginia; and
Harwich, Massachusetts, have SWAT teams.
The campus police at the University of
Central Florida have a SWAT unit—even
though the county SWAT team is available.
Kraska refers to the proliferation as the “mil-
itarization of Mayberry,” and he is rightly
alarmed that the special units are becoming a
normal and permanent part of law enforce-
ment agencies.
Under the Military Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Officials Act, Congress directed
the military to make equipment and facilities
available to civilian police in the anti-drug
effort. As a result, police departments began to
acquire more sophisticated tactical equip-
ment: automatic weapons with laser sights
and sound suppressors, surveillance equip-
ment such as Laser Bugs that can detect
sounds inside a building by bouncing a laser
beam off a window, pinhole cameras, flash
and noise grenades, rubber bullets, bullet-
proof apparel, battering rams, and more. The
Boone County Sheriff’s office in Indiana has
acquired an amphibious armored personnel
carrier.34 In Fresno, California, the SWAT unit
has access to two helicopters equipped with
night vision goggles and an armored person-
nel carrier with a turret.35 According to Cal
Black, a former SWAT commander for the
FBI, “The equipment SWAT teams use today
is many times more sophisticated than it was
when I began in SWAT in the 1970s. . . .
Because of this high-tech equipment, the abil-
ity of SWAT teams has increased dramatical-
ly.”36
The National Institute of Justice report
on the DOJ-DOD technology “partnership”
boasted a number of high-tech items that
SWAT teams now have at their disposal.
Included among the showcase military
technologies deemed applicable to law
enforcement were “inconspicuous systems
that can detect from more than 30 feet away
weapons with little or no metal content as
well as those made of metal.”37 Other items
in the pipeline include “a gas-launched,
wireless, electric stun projectile”; a “vehicu-
lar laser surveillance and dazzler system”;
“pyrotechnic devices such as flash-bang
grenades [and] smoke grenades”; instru-
ments of “crowd control”; mobile, even
hand-held, systems to locate gunfire; and
tagging equipment to locate, identify, and
monitor the “movement of individuals,
vehicles and containers.”38 Special body
armor and helmets are also under consider-
ation. Nick Pastore, former police chief in
New Haven, Connecticut, says: “I was
offered tanks, bazookas, anything I wanted.
. . . I turned it all down because it feeds a
mind-set that you’re not a police officer
serving a community, you’re a soldier at
war.”39
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An even more disturbing development
reported in the Kraska-Kappeler study, how-
ever, is the growing tendency of police depart-
ments to use SWAT units in routine policing
activity. The Fresno SWAT unit, for example,
sends its 40-person team, with full military
dress and gear, into the inner city “war zone”
to deal with problems of drugs, gangs, and
crime. One survey respondent described his
department’s use of SWAT teams in the fol-
lowing way:
We’re into saturation patrols in hot
spots. We do a lot of our work with
the SWAT unit because we have big-
ger guns. We send out two, two-to-
four-men cars, we look for minor viola-
tions and do jump-outs, either on peo-
ple on the street or automobiles. After
we jump-out the second car provides
periphery cover with an ostentatious
display of weaponry. We’re sending a
clear message: if the shootings don’t
stop, we’ll shoot someone.40
A midwestern community with a popula-
tion of 75,000 sends out patrols dressed in
tactical uniform in a military personnel carri-
er. The armored vehicle, according to the
SWAT commander, stops “suspicious vehi-
cles and people. We stop anything that
moves. We’ll sometimes even surround suspi-
cious homes and bring out the MP5s
(machine gun pistols).”41
Unfortunately, it is likely that the number
of SWAT “patrols” will rise in the future. In
their survey, when Kraska and Kappeler asked
the question, Is your department using the
tactical operations unit as a proactive patrol
unit to aid high crime areas? 107 departments
indicated that they were. Sixty-one percent of
all respondents thought it was a good idea. In
fact, 63 percent of the departments in that sur-
vey agreed that SWAT units “play an impor-
tant role in community policing strategies.”42
According to Police magazine, “Police officers
working in patrol vehicles, dressed in urban
tactical gear and armed with automatic
weapons are here—and they’re here to stay.”43
Limiting the SWAT Mission
to Bona Fide Emergencies
The relatively recent phenomenon of spe-
cial, commando-type units within civilian law
enforcement agencies is occurring on both
sides of the Atlantic. The British counterpart
to the SWAT team in America is the Police
Support Unit (PSU). In 1993 the British Journal
of Criminology published opposing views on
British paramilitarism by P. A. J. Waddington
and Anthony Jefferson. Both scholars agreed
that public order policing in Britain by PSUs
was becoming paramilitaristic, but they could
not agree on a precise definition of “paramili-
tarism.” While Jefferson defined paramili-
tarism as “the application of quasi-military
training, equipment, philosophy and organi-
zation to questions of policing,” Waddington
confined paramilitarism to police methods of
riot control, namely, “the coordination and
integration of all officers deployed as squads
under centralised command and control.”44 A
third scholar, Alice Hills, has sought the mid-
dle ground, rounding off the differences by
looking at paramilitary forces of other coun-
tries, such as the French Gendarmerie, the
Italian Carabiniere, the Frontier Guards in
Finland, Civil Defense Units in Saudi Arabia,
and the National Security Guards in India. By
Hills’s reckoning, paramilitarism should “be
defined in terms of function . . . and relation-
ships; of the police to the military and to the
state, as well as to the legal system and style of
political process.”45 In general, however, as has
been the case in this country, British studies
have largely “neglected . . . the relationship of
the police to the other uniformed services, par-
ticularly the army, in the late twentieth centu-
ry.”46
What is disturbing is that under any of the
definitions offered by the British analysts,
American SWAT teams can be regarded as
paramilitary units. The institutional cooper-
ation between civilian law enforcement and
the military has emerged under the direct
political sponsorship of elected leaders in the
national legislature and the presidency. In
1981 Congress diluted the Posse Comitatus
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Act—a law that was designed to keep the mil-
itary out of civilian affairs—in order to give
the military an active role in the war on
drugs, and that role has been expanded by
subsequent congressional action and by the
support of presidents of both political par-
ties. The military–law enforcement connec-
tion is now a basic assumption within the
federal government, and it receives enthusias-
tic support in government literature. For
example, in a 1997 National Institute of Jus-
tice report on the transfer of military tech-
nology to civilian police departments, the
Joint Program Steering Group explained the
“convergence in the technology needs of the
law enforcement and military communities”
as due to their “common missions.” In the
military’s newest “peacekeeping” role abroad,
it is obliged—much as civilian police—to be
“highly discreet when applying force,” given
the “greater presence of members of the
media or other civilians who are observing, if
not recording, the situation.”47 Moreover, the
military’s enemy abroad has begun to resem-
ble law enforcement’s enemy at home: “Law
officers today confront threats that have
more and more military aspects” due to the
changed “nature of criminals and their
crimes.”48
With widespread political sanction, the
military is now encouraged to share training,
equipment, technology—and, most subtle,
mentality—with state and local civilian police.
SWAT team members undergo rigorous train-
ing similar to that given military special oper-
ations units. Training, as one study has noted,
“may seem to be a purely technical exercise,
[but] it actually plays a central role in paramil-
itary subculture”49 and moreover reinforces
“the importance of feeling and thinking as a
team.”50 The research of Kraska and Kappeler
revealed that SWAT units are often trained
alongside, or with the support of, military spe-
cial forces personnel. Of 459 SWAT teams
across the country, 46 percent acquired their
initial training from “police officers with spe-
cial operations experience in the military,” and
43 percent with “active-duty military experts
in special operations.”51 Almost 46 percent
currently conducted training exercises with
“active-duty military experts in special opera-
tions.”52 Twenty-three respondents to the sur-
vey indicated that they trained with either
Navy SEALs or Army Rangers.53 One respon-
dent went into greater detail:
We’ve had special forces folks who
have come right out of the jungles
of Central and South America. . . .
All branches of military service are
involved in providing training to
law enforcement. U.S. Marshals act
as liaisons between the police and
military to set up the training—our
go-between. They have an arrange-
ment with the military through
JTF-6 [Joint Task Force 6]. . . . I just
received a piece of paper from a
four-star general who tells us he’s
concerned about the type of train-
ing we’re getting. We’ve had teams
of Navy Seals and Army Rangers
come here and teach us everything.
We just have to use our judgment
and exclude the information like:
“at this point we bring in the mor-
tars and blow the place up.”54
Because of their close collaboration with
the military, SWAT units are taking on the
warrior mentality of our military’s special
forces. SWAT team organization resembles
that of a special combat unit, with a com-
mander, a tactical team leader, a scout, a
rear guard or “defenseman,” a marksman
(sniper), a spotter, a gasman, and para-
medics. Moreover, SWAT teams, like mili-
tary special forces, are elite units: Their rig-
orous team training; high-tech armament;
and “battle dress uniforms,” consisting of
lace-up combat boots, full body armor,
Kevlar helmets, and goggles with “ninja”
style hoods, reinforce their elitism within
law enforcement agencies. One command-
er—who disapproved of proactive SWAT
policing and turned down requests from
team members to dress in black battle dress
uniforms while on patrol—nevertheless
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understood its attraction to team members:
“I can’t blame them, we’re a very elite unit,
they just want to be distinguishable.”55
The so-called war on drugs and other mar-
tial metaphors are turning high-crime areas
into “war zones,” citizens into potential ene-
mies, and police officers into soldiers. Prepar-
ing the ground for the 1994 technology trans-
fer agreement between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Justice,
Attorney General Reno addressed the defense
and intelligence community. In her speech,
Reno compared the drug war to the Cold War,
and the armed and dangerous enemies abroad
to those at home:
So let me welcome you to the kind of
war our police fight every day. And
let me challenge you to turn your
skills that served us so well in the
Cold War to helping us with the war
we’re now fighting daily in the streets
of our towns and cities across the
Nation.56
The martial rhetoric can be found in
both political parties. Bill McCollum (R-
Fla.), chairman of the Subcommittee on
Crime of the House Judiciary Committee,
has criticized the Clinton administration
for not waging the war on drugs aggressive-
ly enough: “The drug crisis is a top—if not
the top—national security threat facing our
nation today . . . [the Clinton] administra-
tion’s clear unwillingness to wage an all-out
drug war cannot go unchallenged.”57 In the
current political climate, anyone who does
not support an escalation of the drug war is
condemned for being “soft on crime.”58
Departmental SWAT teams have accept-
ed the military as a model for their behavior
and outlook, which is distinctly impersonal
and elitist; American streets are viewed as
the “front” and American citizens as the
“enemy.” The sharing of training and tech-
nology by the military and law enforcement
agencies has produced a shared mindset,
and the mindset of the warrior is simply not
appropriate for the civilian police officer
charged with enforcing the law. The soldier
confronts an enemy in a life-or-death situa-
tion. The soldier learns to use lethal force
on the enemy, both uniformed and civilian,
irrespective of age or gender. The soldier
must sometimes follow orders unthinking-
ly, acts in concert with his comrades, and
initiates violence on command. That men-
tality, with which new recruits are strenu-
ously indoctrinated in boot camp, can be a
matter of survival to the soldier and the
nation at war.
The civilian law enforcement officer, on
the other hand, confronts not an “enemy”
but individuals who, like him, are both sub-
ject to the nation’s laws and protected by the
Bill of Rights. Although the police officer can
use force in life-threatening situations, the
Constitution and numerous Supreme Court
rulings have circumscribed the police offi-
cer’s direct use of force, as well as his power of
search and seizure.59 In terms of violence, the
police officer’s role is—or should be—purely
reactive. When a police officer begins to
think like a soldier, tragic consequences—
such as the loss of innocent life at Waco—will
result.
After some controversial SWAT shootings
spawned several wrongful death lawsuits
against the police department of Albuquer-
que, New Mexico, the city hired Professor Sam
Walker of the University of Nebraska to study
its departmental practices. According to
Walker: “The rate of killings by the police was
just off the charts. . . . They had an organiza-
tional culture that led them to escalate situa-
tions upward rather than de-escalating.”60 The
city of Albuquerque subsequently hired a new
police chief and dismantled its SWAT unit.
The tiny town of Dinuba, California (pop-
ulation 15,000), created a SWAT unit in the
spring of 1997. A few months later an inno-
cent man, Ramon Gallardo, was killed by the
SWAT team when it raided his home looking
for one of his teenage sons. The SWAT unit
rushed into the Gallardo household at 7 a.m.
wearing hoods and masks, yelling “search
warrant.” Gallardo and his wife were awak-
ened by the ruckus, but before they could
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determine what was happening, Ramon was
shot 15 times.61
A police brutality lawsuit was later
brought against the city. At trial, the police
said they had to shoot in self-defense because
Gallardo had grabbed a knife. Gallardo’s wife
testified that the knife on the scene did not
belong to her husband and alleged that the
police had planted it there to legitimize the
shooting. The jury awarded the Gallardo
family $12.5 million. Because the whopping
verdict exceeded the small town’s insurance
coverage, the city is now in financial straits.
After Gallardo’s killing, the city fathers of
Dinuba disbanded the SWAT unit and gave
its military equipment to another police
department.62
Some local jurisdictions may wish to
retain SWAT units for the special skills they
possess, but the deployment of such units
should be limited to extraordinary circum-
stances—such as a hostage situation. If a
SWAT unit is created (or retained), the need
for that unit should be assessed annually by
locally elected officials. Policymakers must
be especially wary of “mission creep” and
guard against it. Inactive SWAT teams have
a strong incentive to expand their original
“emergency” mission into more routine
policing activities to justify their existence.
In recent years, city officials in Dallas and
Seattle have curtailed the activity of their
SWAT units, taking them off drug raids
and suicide calls. Other cities should follow
their lead by curtailing the SWAT mission—
or even dismantling the entire unit as was
done in Albuquerque and Dinuba.     
Conclusion
The militarization of law enforcement in
America is a deeply disturbing develop-
ment. Police officers are not supposed to be
warriors. The job of a police officer is to
keep the peace while adhering to constitu-
tional procedures. Soldiers, on the other
hand, consider enemy personnel human
targets. Confusing the police function with
the military function can lead to dangerous
and unintended consequences—such as
unnecessary shootings and killings.
The proliferation of SWAT teams is par-
ticularly worrisome because such units are
rarely needed. SWAT teams are created to
deal with emergency situations that are
beyond the capacity of the ordinary street
cop. But, as time passes, inactive SWAT
units tend to jettison their original, limited
mission for more routine policing activities.
Local jurisdictions should carefully assess
the need for SWAT units and guard against
the danger of mission creep. SWAT teams
do possess specialized skills, but they
should only be deployed on those extraor-
dinary occasions when their skills are neces-
sary—such as a hostage situation.
More generally, Congress should recognize
that federal policies have contributed to the
culture of paramilitarism that currently per-
vades many local police departments. Federal
lawmakers should discourage paramilitarism
by restoring the traditional American princi-
ple of civil-military separation embodied in
the Posse Comitatus Act. The Military Coop-
eration with Law Enforcement Officials Act
created a dangerous loophole in the Posse
Comitatus Act. That loophole should be
closed immediately. Congress should also
abolish all military-civilian law enforcement
joint task forces and see to it that all military
hardware loaned, given, or sold to law enforce-
ment agencies is destroyed or returned.
Armored personnel carriers and machine
guns, should not be a part of everyday law
enforcement in a free society.
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